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Precision and Relativity 
in Aristotle’s Account of Virtue as the Mean
Abstract
The paper discusses Aristotle’s account of virtue as the mean, according to which our re-
sponses should aim at what is intermediate in respect of feelings and actions, by focusing 
on the problem of hitting the mean in virtuous responses. The problems with achieving 
precision in hitting the mean are due to the fact that one has to hit the intermediate by 
responding appropriately to a wide range of circumstances, which are mutable, situation-
dependent and discernment of which rests on perception. It is argued that the precision 
involved in finding the mean is best understood from the analogy with medical or dietetic 
practice. Hence, Aristotle’s use of medical examples is closely analyzed in order to clarify 






































background	 provided	 by	medical	 and	 dietetic	 context	 from	which	most	 of	
Aristotle’s	examples,	which	were	meant	 to	clarify	 the	problem,	come.	I	do	
not	wish	to	claim	(or	to	deny,	for	that	matter)	that	Aristotle’s	understanding	






















































In	his	discussion	of	how	 the	virtue	of	character	consists	 in	 the	mean	Aris-
totle	 is	 first	concerned	with	showing	 that	 it	 is	not	 the	mean	in	arithmetical	
























of	 individual	 agent	 relativity,5	 and	 if	 any	 version	 of	 agent	 relativity	were	
accepted,	 it	 should	not	amount	 to	 individual	 relativism	assuming	virtue	 to	











The	 second	 course	 is	 taken	 by	 Leighton	
(1995).
5





































the	 intermediate	 in	 the	object	 is	 equidistant	 from	 its	 extremities,	while	 the	















































activities,	 in	 the	process	 in	which	 the	virtues	of	 character	 are	 acquired	by	
doing	virtuous	actions;	 that	 is,	we	become	 just	by	doing	 just	actions,	 tem-
perate	by	doing	temperate	actions,	brave	by	doing	brave	actions,	etc.	(II.1,	
















mediate’	 interchangeably,	 which	 can	 appear	
puzzling.	 In	general,	 I	 speak	of	“the	mean”,	
but	 I	 switch	 to	 “the	 intermediate”	mostly	 in	
discussing particular passages that I quote in 
Irwin’s	 translation.	 Irwin	 translates	 meson 





One	 can	 take	 (a)	 and	 (b)	 as	 two	 different	
points,	but	I	take	them	as	two	aspects	of	the	
same	 point,	 because	 they	 presuppose	 each	
other:	it	is	not	possible	for	(b)	to	hold	without	
(a) to be the case. So (b) cannot be independ-




speaks	 of	 excess,	 deficiency	 and	 mean	 that	
can	be	“relative	to	one	another”	and	“relative	
to  us”  (Eudemian Ethics	 II.3,	 1220b21–23).	
It seems that Aristotle has  the same contrast 





















































us:	that	it	is	not a midpoint in	the	sense	of	the	arithmetical	mean,	that	it	is	not 
one	determined	point	in	the	continuum,	and	not the same for everyone and in 
every	situation.	Hence,	the	example	closely	illustrates	the	points	previously	
stated	about	the	mean	relative	to	us	by	showing	what	it	is	not,	and	it	does	this	


























ters	 lacking	 in	 fixity,	 the	 central	 issue	 that	 the	 practitioners	 in	 the	 dietetic	
context	 have	 to	 deal	with	 is	 the	problem	of	 limited	precision	 attainable	 in	
prescribing	food	or	therapy.	Practical	matters,	too,	are	unstable	and	mutable.	
Hence,	precision	becomes	an	issue	in	ethics	as	well.	Because	only	a	limited	







































































itly point  to  the difference in  this passage.12	We	should,	however,	have	the	
differences in mind.
In	focusing	on	what	is	intermediate,	craftsmen	look	to	the	intermediate	and	
guide	 their	production	 towards	 it	 in	order	 to	make	 the	product	 conform	 to	
it	 (1106b8–9).	The	 intermediate	here	 is	 the	standard	 to	which	each	product	
should	conform.	In	most	crafts	precision	is	thus	associated	with	the	produc-
tion  of  a  thing  that  is  finished  and  perfected  to  such  a  degree  that  it  cor-


















is  not  such  a  product  that  a  doctor  can  make  it  out  of  some  material  as  a 
completed	independent	thing.	It	is	a	state	to	which	the	diseased	body	should	

































































































and  feelings. We  can  think  of  the  phronimos	 (“the	 intelligent	 person”),	 or	
of  the right reason (orthos logos),	as	a	standard.	The	phronimos makes  the 
standard	in	the	sense	of	the	agent	who	always	responds	correctly	and	is	thus	


















and	because	 it	 is	 feelings	 and	actions	 that	 admit	of	 excess,	 deficiency	and	
an	intermediate	condition	(1106b16–18).	That	our	feelings	can	be	excessive	




















too	much	nor	 too	 little,	 come	 into	 play?	Another	 passage	 is	 perhaps	more	
helpful	 in	clarifying	 the	 relation	between	 the	 intermediate	and	 the	 issue	of	





































































































































One	can	 think	of	vices	 as	opposites	of	virtues	 and	assume,	moreover,	 that	
there	 is	a	vice	corresponding	to	every	virtue.	On	Aristotle’s	understanding,	














qualified	as	either	excessive	or	deficient,	with	 the	effect	 that	 there	 is	noth-
ing	 intrinsically	good	about	 it.	The	 intermediate	 response	will	only	appear	
excessive	or	deficient	if	compared	with	only	one	of	the	extremes.	Thus,	for	
instance,	 the	 brave	 person	 appears	 rash	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 coward,	 and	











deficiency,	 in	others	 the	excess	 that	 is	more	opposed.	Thus,	cowardice,	 the	
deficiency,	is	more	opposed	to	bravery	than	rashness,	the	excess;	on	the	other	











































































it  comes more naturally  to human beings  to 
exact  a  penalty  from  the  offender  [than  to 
overlook	 an	 offence];	 and	 moreover	 irri-





intermediate  condition.  But  no  doubt  this  is 
hard,	 especially	 in	 particular	 cases,	 since	 it	

















situation.	To	 respond	appropriately	we	need	 to	 rely	on	perception	 to	grasp	
particulars	correctly.	To	respond	correctly	 is	 to	have	one’s	feelings	and	ac-
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Preciznost i relativnost u Aristotelovom poimanju 
vrline kao prave mjere
Sažetak
U članku se raspravlja o Aristotelovom poimanju vrline kao prave mjere, prema kojemu bi 
naše reakcije trebale težiti onome srednjemu u osjećajima i djelovanjima, fokusirajući se na 
problem pogađanja sredine prilikom reakcija na temelju vrlina. Problemi postizanja preciznosti 
u pogađanju te sredine javljaju se zbog činjenice da pojedinac mora pogoditi sredinu prikladno 
reagirajući na širok spektar okolnosti koje su promjenjive, ovisne o situaciji i razlikovanje kojih 
ovisi o percepciji. Smatra se da se preciznost vezana za pronalazak prave mjere ponajbolje ra-
zumijeva preko analogije s medicinskom ili dijetetskom praksom. Stoga se Aristotelovo korište-
nje medicinskih primjera pozorno analizira s ciljem razjašnjenja nekih problema i odgovaranja 




Präzision und Relativität in Aristoteles’ Auffassung der Tugend 
als der vernünftigen Mitte
Zusammenfassung
Das Referat diskutiert Aristoteles’ Herangehen an die Tugend als den Mittelweg, wonach unsere 
Reaktionen hinsichtlich der Gefühle und Taten nach dem Mittleren trachten sollten, indem sie 
bei tugendhaften Reaktionen auf das Erzielen der Mitte fokussiert bleiben. Die Schwierigkeiten 
mit der Erreichung der Präzision beim Treffen dieser Mitte liegen in der Tatsache, dass der 
Einzelne den Mittelweg einzuschlagen hat, indem er angemessen auf ein ausgedehntes Spektrum 
von Umständen reagiert, die wandelbar und situationsbedingt sind, und deren Wahrnehmung 
auf der Perzeption ruht. Man vertritt die Ansicht, dass die Präzision, involviert bei der Findung 
der Mitte, bestens in Analogie zu der Medizin- bzw. Diätpraxis zu begreifen sei. Daher wird 
Aristoteles’ Nutzung der medizinischen Beispiele eingehend analysiert, mit dem Ziel, einige 
Probleme zu klären, sowie zumindest etliche Fragen zu beantworten, die Aristoteles’ Doktrin 


















ception  in hitting  the  right measure. Yet  the 
medical author seems to be more ready than 
Aristotle	to	accept	the	knowledge	with	mini-















Précision et relativité dans la notion aristotélicienne de vertu 
en tant que juste mesure
Résumé
L’article discute de la notion aristitélicienne de vertu en tant juste mesure, d’après laquelle nos 
réactions devraient tendre vers l’intermédiaire dans les sentiments et les actions, en se focali-
sant sur la difficulté à atteindre le milieu au moment des réactions vertueuses. La difficulté à 
atteindre cette précision en visant le milieu est due au fait que l’individu doit le faire en réa-
gissant de manière adéquate à tout un spectre de circostances changeantes, dépendantes de la 
situation et dont le discernement dépend de la perception. On considère que la précision liée à 
la découverte de la juste mesure se comprend le mieux à travers l’analogie avec la pratique mé-
dicale et diététique. C’est pourquoi on analyse attentivement l’emploi par Aristote d’exemples 
médicaux, dans le but de clarifier certains problèmes et de répondre à quelques-unes au moins 
des questions ouvertes par la doctrine d’Aristote.
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